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Abst rac t - - In  this paper, we consider one of the two open problems proposed by Pieprzyk [1], 
i.e., whether a permutation generator which is designed using five rounds of the Data Encryption 
Standard and a single pseudorandom function is a super pseudorandom permutation generator. First, 
we show that ¢(f, f, f2, f) is pseudorandom. Then, using the pseudorandomness of ~(f2, f, f, f) and 
~b(f, f, f2, f), we show ~O(f, f2, f, f, f) is super pseudorandom. 
Keywords--Pseudorandom, DES-like permutation, (D-)distinguishing circuit, Pseudorandom 
permutation generator, Super pseudorandom permutation generator. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Random number generators are commonly used in many different areas of science. However, 
truly random generators have some problems. The most evident is the unreproducibil ity of 
generated numbers, so that it is impossible to repeat the same experiment. Another problem 
is related to the assessment of randomness of generators. Classical pseudorandom generators 
are deterministic algorithms that  provide numbers which 'look' like random ones. As they have 
well-defined mathematical  structures, they can be analyzed easily. The basic measurement of 
classical pseudorandom generators is the similarity of generated numbers to truly random ones. 
A generator is said to be pseudorandom if it is ' indistinguishable' fi om the truly random one, 
assuming polynomially bounded computing resources. 
The existence of pseudorandom bit generator has been proved by Levin providing existence of 
a one-way function. Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [2] showed that having a pseudorandom 
bit generator, one can design a pseudorandom function generator. 
A paper by Luby and Rackoff [3] on the construction of pseudorandom permutations from 
pseudorandom functions based on a design principle of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
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has recently initiated a burst of research activities on applications and generalizations of these 
results. They showed how to construct a pseudorandom invertible permutation generator with 
three pseudorandom functions and application of three rounds of DES-like permutations (this 
structure is denoted as ga(h, g, f)).  
Later, Pieprzyk [4] showed that ~p(f2, f, f, f )  and ~b(f, f, f, f2) are pseudorandom and they are 
secure against chosen plaintext attacks. 
Luby and Raekoff also introduced the notion of super pseudorandomness, where the block cryp- 
tosystem is secure against a chosen plaintext/ciphertext at ack. They suggested that ga(h, g, f, e) 
is super pseudorandom, which is a structure with fbur pseudorandom functions in four DES-like 
permutations. 
Sadeghiyan and Pieprzyk [1] showed how to construct a super pseudorandom permutation gen- 
erator applying a single pseudorandom function, i.e., ~b(f 2, 1, f, f2, 1, f)  is super pseudorandom 
and it is secure against a chosen plaintext/eipher text attack. 
In this paper, we prove that having a single pseudorandom function and five rounds of DES-like 
permutations it is possible to construct super pseudorandom permutation generators. 
2. PREL IMINARIES  
The notations we use, are similar to [4]. The set of all natural numbers is denoted by N. Let 
E ~ = {0, 1} ~ be the set of all 2 ~ binary strings of length n, The concatenation of the two binary 
strings z and y is denoted by (z, y), and the bit-by-bit ezel~zsive or of z and y by z ® y. Le t /4 ,  
be the set of all functions on E ~*, i.e., {f I f : E ~ ---+ E '~} and it consists of 2 n2" elements. The 
composition of two functions f and g is defined as f o g(z) = f (g(z ) ) .  The /-fold composition 




[1] For f E H~, define the DES- l ike  (Feistel  type)  permutat ion  D2n,f E P2r~ 
D2,~,f(L, R) = (R 0 f (L ) ,  L), 
where R, L E E ~. 
DEFINITION 2. [1] For f l ,  f2, . . . , fi E tt~, define the composition of DES- l ike  permutat ions  
as, 
~b(fi , . . . ,  f2, f l )  = Dz~,f~ o . . .  o D.2,~,f.~ 0 D'2n,fl C P2~. 
DEFINITION 3. [3] Let l(n) be a polynomial in n, a funct ion  generator  F = {Fn[ n E N} is a 
collection of functions with the following properties: 
• Indexing: Each F~ specifies, for each key k of length I(n), a function fn,k c Hn. 
* Poly-t ime evaluation: Given a key k E E l('~), and a string x E E n, f~,k(z) can be computed 
in polynomial t ime in n. 
DEFINITION 4. [3] A fimction generator F is pseudorandom if there is no distinguishing circuit 
family for F. A dis t ingu ish ing c ircuit  fami ly  fbr F is an int~nite family {Cnl, Cn2," • " [ nl < 
n2 < ""  }, such that for some pair of constants (s, c) and for each 771 there is a circuit C~: 
1. CTI is an acyclic circuit which contains Boolean gates of type AND, OR and NOT,  and 
constant gates of type zero and one, and a particular kind of gates named orac le  gates.  
Each oracle gate has an n-bit input and and n-bit output and it is evaluated using some 
function from Hn. The oracle circuit C,~ has a single bit output. 
2. The size of C~, is less than or equal to n '~. The size of an oracle circuit C,~, say [C,,,[, is 
the total number of connections between gates, Boolean gates, constant gates and oracle 
gates. 
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3. We let Pr {C~[Hn]} be the probability that the output bit of C~ is one when a function is 
randomly chosen from H~ and used to evaluate the oracle gates. We let Pr {C~ [F~] } be 
the probability that the output bit of Cn is one when a key £ of length l(n) is randomly 
chosen and f n is used to evaluate the oracle gates. The distinguishing probability for C,~ k 
is 
1 
IPr{C,~[H,~]} - Pr {C,~[F~]}] > - - .  
- -  ??c  
When the block eryptosystem is secure against chosen piaintext/ciphertext at ack, it is called 
super pseudorandom. This notion only applies for invertible permutations and is stated formally 
in three following definitions. 
DEFINITION 5. [3] A permutat ion  generator  F is a function generator such that each function 
f~,,k is 1 - 1 and onto. Let T = {~:  n E N}, where FT--~ = {Y~,k I k E Ez(n)}, where ]n,k is the 
inverse function of fn,k. F is called invertible if F is also a permutation generator. We say F is 
pseudorandom if it is pseudorandom as a function generator as defined above. 
DEFINITION 6. [3] A super  d ist inguishing circuit fami ly for F is an infinite family of circuits 
{Ca,, Ca2,""  I nl ~ n2 ~ ""  }, where each circuit is an oracle circuit containing two types of 
oracle gates, normal  and inverse. For some pair of constants (s, c) and for each n there is a 
circuit C,n such that: 
1. IC~ I <_ n ~. 
2. $Ve let Pr {Cn[Pn]} be the probability that the output bit of Ca is 1 when a permutation 
c~ is randomly chosen fi'om P~,. and ~r and ~ are used to evaluate normal and inverse gates 
in C~, respectively, where ~ is the inverse permutation of ~. We let Pr {Cn[Fn]} be the 
probability that the out,put bit of Cn is one when a key k of length l(n) is randomly chosen 
and f~k and fff are used to evaluate the normal and inverse oracle gates in Ca, respectively. 
The distinguishing probability for C,, 
1 
IPr{C,~[Pn]} - Pr {G~[F~]}t > - - .  
11, c 
DEFINITION 7. [3] An invertible permutation generator F is said to be a super  pseudorandom 
permutat ion  generator  if there is no super distinguishing circuit family for F. 
If F is a super pseudorandom permutation generator, it is secure against a chosen plain- 
text/ciphertext a tack where a cryptanalyst can interactively choose plaintext blocks and see 
their encryptions and choose eneryptions and see their corresponding plaintext blocks. 
First, a definition for independent permutations i  given, which would be used in the proof of 
Theorem 3. 
DEFINITION 8. [3] D-dist inguishing fami ly of circuits for two invertible pseudorandom per- 
mutation generators (II1, FI2) is an infinite family of circuits {DC.n,, DCn2, ' "  [n l  <( n2  < ' '  " } ,  
where each circuit is an oracJ'e circuit containing two types of oracle gates, such that for some 
pair of constants (r, s) and for each n there exists a circuit DCn: 
• tDG,.I <_ n' .  
• Pr {DC,~[P~,P~] }: probability that the output bit of DCn is 1, when two pennutations 
t)1 and P2 are chosen independently and randomly from lPn and are used to evaluate the 
two types of oracle gates of DC.n, respectively. 
Pr {DC, z[HI,II2]}: probability that the output bit of DC,  is 1, when a ]~ep ]c of length 
l(?z) is randomly chosen and pl,k and p'2,k are used to evaluate the two types of oracle 
gates, respectively. 
1 
IPr {DC,~[tv,~,Pn]} - Pr {DC,~[rI,,rI,2] } l > - - .  
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DEFINITION 9. [3] We say that [I 1 and II2 are two independent  permutation generators, if 
there is no D-distinguishing oracle circuit family for (II1,112). 
REMARK 1. Except for two particular simple circuits, the D-distinguishing oracle circuits are 
generalizations of the distinguishing circuits and the super distinguishing circuits. 
If there is no D-distinguishing circuit for a permutation generator (FI1, FI1), then there is no 
distinguishing circuit family for i-it and it is pseudorandom, provided that the D-distinguishing 
circuit is not an identity test. 
Moreover, if there is no D-distinguishing circuit for a permutation generator 111 and its inverse 
111, then there is no super distinguishing circuit family for 111 and it is super pseudorandom, 
provided that the D-distinguishing circuit is not an inversion test. 
DEFINITION 10. [4] I f  we  use  random functions instead of pseudorandom ones, then a permuta- 
tion generator for which there is no distinguisher, is called a randomizer .  
DEFINITION 11. [4] A function f is said to be random (denoted as f •r Hn) if for any fixed 
argument x • E ~, f(x) is an independent and uniformly distributed random variable. 
PROPOSITION 1. [5] If f, g •~. F~ are independently chosen pseudorandom functions, then 
¢(g, f, f, f )  and ¢( f  , f, g, f) are super pseudorandom permutation generators. 
THEOREM 1. [4] Let f Er F~ be a pseudorandom function, then ¢(f2, f, f, f)  is pseudorandom. 
3. CONSTRUCTION OF A SUPER PSEUDORANDOM 
PERMUTATION GENERATOR 
Our goal is to show that, for f Er F,~, ¢(f,  f2  f, f, f) is a super pseudorandom permutation 
generator. For this, first we show that, for f Er Hn, ¢(f ,  f, f2, f)  is a randomizer. Then, we 
prove that ¢(f ,  f, f2, f) is a pseudorandom permutation generator if f E~ F~. Finally, we show 
¢(f ,  f2, f, f, f) is super pseudorandom. 
From now on, let 
G1 = ~(f,  g, f, f, f), G2 = ~(.q, f, f, f), G3 = g)(f, f, 9, f) ,  
G1 =~b(f, f2, f , f , f ) ,  G2=~b(f 2 , f , f , f ) ,  Ga=~b(f,f, f2, f). 
3.1. Pseudorandomness  of  g,(f , f, f2, f)  
In this section, we'll prove that ~(f, f, f2  f) is pseudorandom using probabilistic arguments. 
LEMMA 1. Let C2n be a distinguishing circuit with m oracle gates. Then, 
3m 2 
IPr{C2~[G3]} - Pr{C2,~[G3]}I _< 2,----7-, 
where f, g e~ Am. 
PROOF. Note that both f and g can be considered as two sequences of 2 n independent and 
uniformly distributed random variables. For two different arguments a, b E E '~, f(a) and f(b) 
are independent random variables. When the input to an oracle gate is (L, R) and the output 
(S, T) (L, R • En), the gate produces the output: 
S = L (9 f2(R® f(L))  (9 f (R® f(L) ® f (L  ® f2(R@ f(L)))),  
T = R ® f(L) ® f (L@ f2(R@ f(L))), 
if it is evaluated by G3 = ¢(f ,  f, f2, f)  or generates the output: 
S = n ®g(R @ f(L)) @ f (R  @ f(L) @ f (L  @g(R ® f(L)))), 
T = R@ f(L) ® f(L @g(R ® f(L))), 
if it is evaluated by G3 = ~P(f, f, g, f). 
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Observe that if we have two oracle gates which are evaluated by ¢( f ,  f, f2, f ) ,  and whose 
inputs are different (an input (L, R) is different from (L', R') if either L ¢ L' or R ¢- R'), then, 
by randomness of f ,  their outputs yield four independent random variables [1]. 
The distinguishing circuit C2n outputs '1' with the same probability either all the oracle gates 
are evaluated with G3 or all the oracle gates are evaluated with G3, if all the random variables 
X~ = f2(R~ • f (L i ) )  are independent from random variables 
Wj = f (L j ) ,  
Yj = f (L j  ® Xj) ,  
Zj = f (R j  O Wj O Yj). 
L R 
S T 
Figure 1. Random variables G3. 
A probabilistic distinguishing circuit generates '1' on its output with different probabilities, if
there is at least one oracle gate in which 
Xj=Wj ,  Yj, o rZ j ,  
for some j = 1 . . . .  , m. 
The probability that in a given oracle gate the output of the f2 function takes a value equal 
to any of 3m internal random variables in m oracle gates with different inputs is 3m/2 n. The 
probability that a circuit distinguishes G3 from G3 is equal to the probability that two of the 
oracles generate dependent random variables. Hence, 
3m 2 
IPrC2~[Ga] - PrC2n[G3]l <_ 2--- ~ 1 
LEMMA 2. ~3 is the same as Lemma 1. 
]Pr{C2n[Q3]} -- Pr{C2n[P2n]}[ <_ 2~ 
where "7(m) is a polynomial in m. 
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PROOF. Fi'om Lemma 1 and [7], there exist polynomials 7~(ra) and 72(rn) such that 
and 
[Pr {C2~[G3]} - Pr {C2~[G3]}1 < 7~(rn) 
- 2 n 
]Pr {C2~[Ga]}- Pr {C2~[P2~]} [ _< 72(m_____~) 
2 ~ 
Hence, 
IPr {C2~[G3]} - Pr {C2n[P2n]}] <_ IPr {C2~[G3]} - Pr {C2n[G3]} I
+ [Pr {C2n[G3]} -- Pr {C2~[P~n]}[ 
< 
- -  2 n , 
where 7(m) = 71(m) + 72(m). 
THEOREM 2. Let f E~ F~ be a pseudorandom function, then ~b(f , f, fg, f )  is pseudorandom. 
PROOF. For definiteness, denote that 
C3 = ~b(f, f, f2, f) ,  
h = ~b(f, f, f2, f) ,  
pf = Pr {C2n[h]}. 
for f C,. Hn, 
for f E~ Fn, and 
What must be shown is that there is no distinguishing circuit family for h. The proof is by 
contradiction. Assume that there is a distinguishing circuit family C = {C2~1, C2n~, • - • }, where 
nl < n2 < . . - ,  for h. 
In particular, for large enough n, we show that if C2~ distinguishes h from H2,~ with probability 
at least 1/n ~ then there is a circuit D~ (where Dn is not much bigger than C2n) which distinguishes 
Fn from H~ with probability at least 1/2n c. 
1 
- -  < IPf - Pr {C2~[P2n]}] < [ ; / -  Pr {C2~[G3]}1 + ]Pr {U2n[G3]} - Pr {C2~[P2=]}[, 
T/c  - -  
where c is a constant. 
As IPr {C2n[G3]} - Pr {C2,~[P2,~]}I is bounded by (7(m))/2 '~, 
1 
IPf - Pr {Cun[G3]}] > - -  - 2n c. 
Prom this, we show that D = {D,~, ; i ~_ N} is a distinguishing circuit family for a function 
generator F. 
Dn is same as C2n except hat each oracle gate X in C2n is replaced with a subcircuit which 
computes '~/;(X', X' ,  X 'o  X',  X'),  where X'  is an oracle gate with an input and output, which are 
both strings of length n. 
When the oracle gates in Dn are evaluated by f~?, where k is a randomly chosen key of length 
l(n), then pf = Pr {The output of Dn is 1}. When the oracle gates in D~ are evaluated by 
f E~ H~,, then Pr {C2n[g3] = 1} = Pr {The output of D,, is 1}. 
Hence, D~ distinguishes H~ from F~ with probability greater than or equal to 1/2n c. This is 
a contradiction to the fact that f is a pseudorandom function. II 
3.2. Super  Pseudorandomness  of  ~( f ,  f2, f, f,  f )  
THEOREM 3. Let f C~ F,~ be a pseudorandom function, then ~I  = ~b(f, f2, f, f, f )  is a super 
pseudorandom permutation. 
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PROOF. Ca and ~1 : ¢(f,  f, f, f2, f) are independent of each other, because G3 = 0(f ,  f, f2, f) 
is pseudorandom and f is a pseudorandom function. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. 
Similarly, G2 and ~1 = ¢(f ,  f2, f, f, f) are independent of each other. 
[Pr {DC2n[GI,~t]} - Pr {DC2,~[P2,~, P2~]}I 
_< IPr {DC2~[GI,~I]} - Pr {DC~.,~[P2,~,~I]}t 
+ IPr {DC2n[P2n, G1]} - Pr {DC2,~[G3, G1]}I 
+ [Pr {DC2n[~3, G1]} - Pr {DC2n[P2n, P2n]}l" 
Since G1 and G3 are pseudorandom permutation generators, and G3 and ~1 are independent of
each other, for some constant c, each of the three absolute values is less than 1/3n c. Thus, 
- -  1 
IPr {DC2n[G1, ~1]} - P r  {DC2,~[P2n, P2n]}l < - - .  
nc 
Since, for distinguishing circuit family, we can consider GI as the inverse of ~1, ~1 is super 
pseudorandom. 1 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that it is possible to construct a super pseudorandom permutation generator 
with a single pseudorandom function, which needs less than six rounds. So, from one pseudoran- 
dom function, we can obtain a super pseudorandom permutation applying five rounds of DES. 
Since it is known that it is impossible to make a super pseudorandom permutation with some 
composition of a single pseudorandom function f and four rounds of DES-like permutations, i.e., 
¢( f f ,  f j  f k  f l )  is not super pseudorandom, for any i,j, k, l, [6], we can say that ~b(f, f2  f ,  f ,  f )  
is the simplest form of the super pseudorandom permutation generators. 
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